We add to the small literature on private school supply by exploring exits of K-2 private schools. We find that the closure of private schools is not an infrequent event and use national survey data from the National Center for Education Statistics to study closures of private schools. We assume that the probability of an exit is a function of excess supply of private schools over demand as well as of the school's characteristics, such as age, size, and religious affiliation. Our empirical results generally support the implications of the model.
INTRODUCTION
Research on private schools has largely focused on the effectiveness of private schools vis-à-vis public schools,  the effect of private school competition on public school performance, 2 and the demand for private schools. 3 Little attention has been paid to issues associated with the behavior of K-2 private schools, and in particular the supply of private schools. 4 In this article we add to the small literature on private school supply by exploring exits of private schools. We find that the closure of private schools is not an infrequent event and use national survey data from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) to study closures of private schools.
Interest in the exit of private schools is part of a larger agenda of generating a better understanding of the supply side of the private school market, and of the nonprofit market more generally. There has been very little written addressing the economic behavior of private schools, and thus little is known about what motivates the behavior of private schools. For example, there appears to be an implicit assumption in the literature on school choice that the supply of private schools will expand to meet the increased demand resulting from a voucher program. However, there is little empirical work on which to base that assumption; Downes and Greenstein (2002) and Barrow (2006) are the only articles we are aware of that consider the supply of private schools.
Other issues and questions regarding nonprofit private school behavior for which there is little or no evidence include the following: Is the functioning of the market for private nonprofit schooling similar to that of a for-profit market? Can we expect private schools to lower tuition or quickly close if there is an "excess supply" of private schools? Do private schools adopt a mission that makes "market forces" largely irrelevant? Does competition among private schools alter their behavior? While economists might assume that market forces will force private schools to behave in a way similar to for-profit firms, we cannot point to empirical evidence to support that assumption.
Beyond the more general interest in the market behavior of private nonprofit schools, the failure of such schools has policy relevance for at least two reasons. First, even if private schools are established, they cannot provide an effective alternative to or competition for public schools unless they remain in operation. Second, students in private schools that close could experience . See Gill et al. (200) for a review. 2. See Geller, Sjoquist, and Walker (2006) . 3. See below for a discussion of studies focused on the determinants of the number of private school students. 4. Hotz and Xiao (2005) and others have explored the effect of minimum quality standards on entry and exit of child care organizations.
negative education outcomes. 5 Furthermore, more knowledge of the entry and exit process for private schools will be important to policy makers and analysts concerned with the impacts of the expansion of voucher programs.
In the next section we draw on the existing literature to develop a framework in which to consider private school closures and to identify factors that might be related to the probability that a nonprofit elementary or secondary private school will close. In section 3 the data are described, followed in section 4 by our empirical results. A summary section concludes the article.
BACKGROUND
There are no existing theoretical models of the entry and exit of private schools. Because most private K-2 schools are nonprofits, we turn first to the nonprofit literature to help motivate our empirical analysis. There are many theories or models of the behavior of nonprofit organizations, but these models provide little help in addressing exits from the private school market. 6 The only model we are aware of that explicitly considers entry and exit of nonprofits is by Schiff (986) , who presents a general model of the response of nonprofit organizations to changes in demand and supply conditions. Although the model is relatively simple, it implies that the nonprofits will respond to changes in demand and cost conditions via entry or exit in much the same way as in the proprietary sector. This is consistent with Weisbrod's (988) observation that economic and political factors help explain why the average age of nonprofits differs across subsectors. Empirical studies of nonprofit closures typically incorporate the characteristics of the organization; quantitative studies of these closures have generally used simple bivariate tables to relate closure rates to such things as age and size of the organization (see, for example, Bowen et al. 994; Bielefeld 994).
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Twombly (2003) is an exception. He used logit analysis to investigate the closure of nonprofits in the human resource sector over the period 992-998, focusing particularly on the effect of changes in state welfare policies on closure. He finds that smaller nonprofits were more likely to fail, as were moderately aged nonprofits. His findings are consistent with most other studies, which find that smaller and newer nonprofits are more likely to fail. 8 5. We are unaware of any empirical evidence on this possibility, but student mobility has generally been associated with lower achievement (Mehana and Reynolds 2004; Alexander, Entwisle, and Dauber 996) . 6. Dollery and Wallis (2004) provide an extensive review; also see Salamon and Anheier (998) and Malani, Philipson, and David (2003) . 7. Twombly (2003) and Hager and Galaskiewicz (2002) provide references to these studies. 8. Hager and Galaskiewicz (2002) summarize the arguments for why newer and smaller nonprofits should be more likely to close.
There are also qualitative studies based on interviews with stakeholders that attempt to identify supply-side factors associated with closure. Hager and Galaskiewicz (2002) , for example, find that closure is associated with financial crisis, competition, burnout, program failure, and loss of key personnel.
There are few theoretical models of exits of for-profit firms. Jovanovic (982) posits a model of passive learning-that is, some firms learn they are inefficient and thus decline and exit the industry. Ericson and Pakes (995) add active learning. However, a growing empirical literature exploring the factors associated with exits of for-profit firms provides some insights. This is a relatively recent literature; Audretsch (994) notes that until the late 980s the literature focused on the rates of entry and exit and not on which of the firm's characteristics may affect entry and exit. Much of this literature focuses on exits of manufacturing firms and thus provides little relevant insight beyond the findings that exits depend on market forces, including demand, cost structure, and competition.
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There is also a literature on entrepreneurial firm closures that is of some relevance.
0 A principal insight is that exits are driven by factors that are both internal and external to the firm or owner. The empirical evidence also suggests that the factors that explain survival are not necessarily the same as the factors associated with performance. Gimeno et al. (997) , for example, argue that survival depends on the level of economic performance as well as the firm's accepted threshold of performance. The latter depends on the entrepreneur's alternative employment opportunities, psychic income, and cost of switching occupations. Detienne, Shepherd, and De Castro (2008) and Bates (2005) summarize the factors that have been associated with persistence of underperforming firms. This literature finds that the probability of exit varies inversely with the size and age of the firm.

Another finding is that in some industries, particularly those in which scale economies play an important role, entries and exits can be characterized as a "revolving door" so that new firms have only a small impact on existing firms (Audretsch 995) . This suggests that the survival of existing firms might not be affected by the entrance of new firms.
9. Mayer and Chappell (992) model exits as a function of profits, industry size, industry growth, and sunk costs. Bernard and Jensen (2002) examine the deaths of manufacturing plants and focus their analysis on four factors: imports from low-wage countries; firm structure and ownership; product market characteristics (in particular, whether the firm sells abroad and whether it produces multiple products); and plant attributes such as age, size and capital intensity, and wage rate. There are several studies (e.g., Audretch and Fritsch 994; Kangasharju 2000; Keeble and Walker 994; Acs, Armington, and Zhang 2007) that consider regional determinants of firm births and deaths and find that the growth in local demand and the relative size of the small-firm sector are important factors. See Caves (998) for a review of this literature. 0. Davidsson (2006) provides a review. . Cressy (2006) explores why young firms are more likely to fail.
To model exits from the private school market, we adopt an approach based on the existing empirical literature on exits of nonprofit organizations and for-profit firms in which we consider factors associated with both external market conditions and internal conditions, including performance. For a forprofit firm, performance would be associated with profit or rate of return. For private schools, it is not clear how to define performance, but we assume it is related to enrollment.
2 We hypothesize that the probability of an exit by a private school is an increasing function of the difference between the supply of and the demand for private schools in the market, as well as a function of school-specific factors. If an excess supply of private school capacity arises, some of the private schools will face pressure to close, either because they cannot generate adequate enrollment or because they have to reduce tuition and thus have inadequate revenue. Given the level of market competition, the probability of failure will depend on school-specific factors and characteristics, such as performance, input prices, size, financial conditions, etc.
3
We specify the model as
where Pr(e i ) is the probability that private school i exits the market, s i represents the existing capacity of private schools in the market in which school i is located, and d i represents the demand for private schools in that market, specified as a function of a set of variables x i . The vector c i represents schoolspecific characteristics and ε i denotes the unobservable factors that influence exit probabilities. We are thus assuming that failure results from a market disequilibrium or from internal weaknesses.
4
In the short run, supply is probably best reflected by the number of available seats in private schools. However, since data on the number of seats are not available, the number of existing private schools is used to measure supply.
The number of private school students is usually taken as the measure of demand. However, if the number of available seats is less than the number of students who want to attend private school, then the number of actual private 2. Clearly, private schools have other performance measures-for example, academic achievement and academic ability of the student body, religious composition of the student body, etc. Although schools might close if they fail to achieve these objectives, these factors seem less likely to drive closures than the failure to have sufficient students. 3. Much of the entrepreneurial literature that considers exits focuses on individual characteristics of entrepreneurs, but this type of information is not available in the private school data we use. 4. There are several possible reasons that a disequilibrium might exist: schools might have been created in anticipation of growth in demand that did not occur; schools might have entered the market in order to learn about it or test it; demand might have declined. Of course, our empirical model only examines the implications of a market disequilibrium; it cannot distinguish among these potential explanations.
school students will not measure demand but will reflect the available supply. It would be desirable to know the number of students in a given market who desire to attend private school, given the existing tuition level. Since this is not available, we use a vector of variables-x in equation -that are thought to be associated with the demand for private schools. So consider the factors associated with the demand side of the market. Weisbrod (975) argues that the demand for nonprofits arises when the government is unable to satisfy the demand for the public good for all residents. He assumes that the government can satisfy only the demand of the median voter. If there is substantial heterogeneity in the demand for public goods, then there will be unmet demand that will provide a market segment that nonprofits can satisfy. For education, heterogeneity in demand could arise from variations in income, wealth, religion, ethnic background, educational level, etc.
Several articles address variations in private school enrollment. These essays, which include James (993), Cohen-Zada (2006) , Schmidt (992), Sonstelie (979), Long and Toma (988), Hamilton and Macauley (99), Husted and Kenny (2002) , and Erickson (986), generally consider only factors associated with the demand for private schools, implicitly assuming that supply will respond to demand.
5 While the specific motivation for each article differs, all the studies include one or more measures of heterogeneity, including the racial, ethnic, immigrant, or religious composition of the population. The motivation for including such variables is that in order for families to send their children to a private school, there should be a commonality of interests that is separate from the commonality associated with proximity in residential location, which affects decisions on attending public schools. 6 Religious affiliation is probably the most common factor uniting students in private school, but other uniting factors are possible, such as high scholastic ability, an interest in a special academic orientation (e.g., an interest in foreign languages or science), racial prejudice, etc. Thus the size of the common interest group should be a factor in determining demand and thus the probability of survival for a private school. These measures of commonality are consistent with Weisbrod's "government failure" model.
7
5. Downes and Greenstein (996, 2002) and Barrow (2006) are the only authors we are aware of who have directly addressed the issue of the supply of private schools. While these articles are concerned with the number of private schools, the analyses focus on demand-side variables, essentially assuming that private schools will arise as a result of demand conditions. 6. We consider commonality and heterogeneity to be the same thing because heterogeneity implies that there is a group with common interests that differs from the majority. In an area where all families with school-age children share the same religion, one would not find the heterogeneity that might motivate the creation of a new school; there would be no common interest different from the majority. 7. James (993), for example, uses Weisbrod's framework, along with limitations on the availability of public education, to explore differences across countries in the percentage of students in private All the studies of private school enrollment (see above) include at least one measure of heterogeneity, typically percent Catholic or percent nonwhite. We adopt these two measures and also follow these studies in selecting other variables for the demand expression. The existing studies of the demand for private schools include measures of income and measures of the quality of public schools, typically expenditures per student and the pupil-teacher ratio. We include the pupil-teacher ratio in our basic model. The existing studies include a variety of other variables-for example, adult educational level, family size, density, employment rate, poverty rate, and crime rate, some of which we include in our basic model and others we employ in alternative specifications. Downes and Greenstein (2002) and Barrow (2006) are closely related to the current article in that they consider private school start-ups, in particular the location of new private schools in California and Illinois, respectively. In addition to the standard set of demand variables such as income and public school quality, both articles include variables to measure the size of the market (i.e., number of students) and the existing supply (number) of private schools. We also include these variables.
In addition to market conditions, we hypothesize that the probability of closure will depend on school-specific factors. Based on the literature focused on exits of nonprofit organizations and for-profit firms, we expect that smaller and newer schools will have a greater risk of failure than larger and longer tenured schools, for the reasons suggested in the literature. Of particular relevance for new private schools is the large initial financial investment required. At least initially, and probably permanently, operating expenditures will exceed tuition revenue. Because a new school might not be able to initially attract a sufficient number of students or might not have sufficient financial resources to see it through the start-up period, new private schools are expected to have a higher probability of failure than existing schools.
If a private school does not generate sufficient enrollment as quickly as planned, the school can continue to operate if it can find sufficient external financing. If the parents are wealthy, they can potentially raise the funds necessary to continue to operate the school. Religious congregations are a major source of such funds, so a church-related school will likely have more access to external funding and thus will be less likely to exit than other types of private schools. Finally, schools that face higher factor prices, particularly teacher salaries, should be more likely to fail. schools. Consistent with Weisbrod's theory, she finds that larger religious heterogeneity leads to a larger share of students in private schools.
DATA
The data set we employ to measure private school closures is drawn from the biennial private school surveys conducted between 989-90 and 2003-4 by the NCES (various years). While the NCES gathered information about private schools prior to 989, the 989-90 survey marked its first attempt to survey all private schools. The data include information on certain characteristics of the schools such as grades served, number of students and teachers, religious or other affiliations, and age of the school.
Information from these surveys indicates that the number of private elementary and secondary schools is increasing. There were 26,72 private schools in the fall of 989; by the fall of 2004, this number had increased to 28,384.
To develop a private school sampling frame, the NCES used its existing list of private schools, as well as a commercial list from Quality Education Data (QED), an organization that sells mailing lists of schools, membership lists from private school associations and denominations, and an area search of randomly selected primary sampling areas.
8 In 989, the NCES's initial universe of private schools was 25,788. Completed surveys were received from 97 percent of these schools. Many of the schools were considered out of scopefor example, home schools or pre-kindergarten only-leaving 20,766 private schools with completed interviews. The file from the NCES consists of these schools. Based on survey methodology, the NCES estimated that the number of private schools in 989 meeting its definition of a private school was 26,72. Using the weights associated with the 20,766 schools completing interviews generates the estimated population of private schools to be 26,72 in 989.
Beginning with the 20,766 schools, we excluded those that offered kindergarten and first grade only, along with those that reported having only one student. We then geo-coded the school addresses to identify the county in which the school was located. Many of the addresses were post office boxes for which the county of location could not be determined. Excluding these schools left 5,046 schools in our sample.
We began by identifying closing schools as those that failed to return three or more consecutive surveys. Because this still risks misclassifying some schools as closing when they have instead quit responding to surveys, we chose a random subset of 2,000 of the 5,046 schools in the full sample. This sample of 2,000 schools includes about 650 schools that appeared to have closed by 2004. We then did an extensive search for each of these schools to verify which ones had, in fact, closed their doors. The final, verified 8. Details of the construction of the frame and the survey can be found in Gerald, McMillen, and Kaufman (992). Note: The observation weights were used to construct the distributions.
sample indicates that 424 schools out of 2,000 closed between the academic years of 989-90 and 2003-4. One possible concern is whether the subsample of 2,000 private schools reflects the entire population of schools. We compared the distributions, using sample weights, for several characteristics of both the 5,046 schools and the subsample of 2,000 schools with those for the population of private schools, as estimated by the NCES (Gerald, McMillen, and Kaufman 992). The major difference in the distributions is that our sample has fewer small religious schools (table ) . 9 In part this is the result of excluding schools with only one grade or one student, but also because small religious schools were more likely to have a post office box address. The distribution by size after excluding 9. The distribution of the population of private schools in table  is very similar (within less than one percentage point) to the distribution reported by Gerald, McMillen, and Kaufman (992) . However, we were unable to reproduce their exact distribution. schools in the smaller category (less than 50 students) is essentially the same for our sample and the population of private schools (see numbers in parentheses in table ). The distributions by region and school level are very similar. Because our sample contains relatively fewer small schools, however, it is skewed toward survival relative to the universe of private schools. The empirical model must confront several basic issues. First, although our interest is with the survival of schools, our data do not allow the obvious empirical strategy of a hazard model. The primary obstacle here is that while the school characteristics are available and vary over the years of the survey, many schools in our sample began their existence many years prior to 989-90. Some characteristics, such as enrollment, change over time, so these should rightfully be included as time-varying covariates. Our data, however, do not include such measures throughout the entire life span. Another issue is that because we do not know the exact year the school closed, the spell lengths cannot be measured precisely. 20 Due to these concerns, we define our dependent variable as a dummy variable, denoted FAIL, which equals one if the private school closed during the period 989-90 to 2003-4, regardless of the year it closed.
Other issues that must be addressed include how to define the geographic area for the market of the private school and which year (990 or 2000) to use for the independent variables taken from the census because failure can occur at any time over the period. Following the approach of other researchers, we treat the county as the market area. Although this does not perfectly capture market area, it seems very reasonable for elementary schools. Of course some schools-for example, boarding schools-draw students from well beyond the county in which they reside. To address the second issue, that is, the date at which to measure the independent variables, we assume that school closing is the result of disequilibrium in the market, which suggests that we measure market conditions at the beginning of the period (990), although there are some exceptions as noted below. Some estimated models also included variables that measure changes over the period.
Following the framework specified in equation , we measure supply, or market saturation, by the number of private schools in the county in 990, scaled by the school-age population in 00,000s (U.S. Bureau of the Census 990, 2000). (Because demand is modeled as if we were trying to explain the percent of students attending private school, it is appropriate to measure supply in per student terms.) This variable, denoted SUPPLY, is an imperfect measure of the supply of private schools. We also constructed a variable, 20. We only know that by the end of the period, a school has closed. It is possible that schools cease responding to surveys over the period but do not close until the last survey year.
denoted NEWSCH, to measure the number of new private schools, scaled by the school-age population (in 00,000s), that opened in the county over the period. We used the NCES surveys to identify new schools. We were unable to successfully geo-code every school in the NCES file, so we are likely to understate the number of existing and new schools in a county.
As noted above, a preferred measure of private school supply would be the number of available private school seats. That information, however, is not obtainable. It is possible that charter schools could be seen as very close substitutes for private schools. Thus, as an additional measure of the growth of supply, we include the growth of charter schools during the period. This is measured by the number of new charter schools formed in the county over the period, as reported by the NCES, scaled by the school-age population (in 00,000s), denoted CHARTER. Note that there were no charter schools in 989.
The modeling framework and the previous literature discussed in section 2 suggest several variables related to the demand for private schools and school-specific variables that are expected to be related to the survival of a private school. We include per capita income (from the Bureau of Economic Analysis), denoted PCI, school-age population in 00,000s (U.S. Bureau of the Census 990, 2000), denoted SCHAGE, and the growth in school-age population in 00,000s, denoted GSCHAGE.
If private and public schools are substitutes, demand for private schools should depend on the performance of public schools. There is unfortunately no measure of school performance such as test scores that is both consistent across states and available at the county level that can be used to measure the quality of public schools. Therefore we follow others and use the studentteacher ratio (obtained from the Common Core of Data from NCES), denoted STRATIO. This was computed as pupil weighted averages for all public school districts located in the county, as reported by NCES.
Heterogeneity of interests has been suggested as a primary driver for the demand for private schools. Although there is no direct measure of this, various measures of heterogeneity have been used in the literature. Cohen-Zada (2006) and most others use percent Catholic to measure heterogeneity of tastes, while Clotfelter (976) and others use percent black. We include the percent of the population that is Catholic (from the Glenmary Research Center 992 and Jones et al. 2002) , denoted PCCATH, as a measure of religious commonality. To account for preferences based on race, we include the percent of the population that is nonwhite, denoted PCNW. These measures are problematic because the degree of heterogeneity will be the same if the percent black, or Catholic, is either zero or 00 percent. We address this first by including the square of the variable (denoted PCCATHSQ and PCNWSQ) and second by measuring heterogeneity as the absolute value of the difference between 50 percent and the value of the variable.
To reflect general economic conditions that might be associated with the financial condition of the private schools, we compute a measure of the employment rate in the county, denoted EMPRATE. This is the number of individuals employed (U.S. Bureau of the Census various years) divided by the size of the adult (age 6 and over) population and expressed as a decimal. We use the value of this ratio in the year prior to the exit of the school, or the value for 2000 if the school does not fail. Although this is not exactly an employment rate, larger values imply stronger economic conditions. Our summary statistics show that EMPRATE is higher, on average, in counties where surviving schools are located.
Additional demographic variables that we include are population density, denoted DEN; whether the county is located in a metropolitan area, denoted METRO; and the poverty rate, denoted POV. The density of a county and whether a county is part of a metropolitan area could increase or decrease the level of competition among private schools. For example, for private schools that are in a metro county, the competition they face likely includes private schools in the other counties. On the other hand, the relevant school-age population (i.e., market size) could be larger than that of the home county. Thus the impact of these variables could be positive or negative. Cohen-Zada (2006) suggests that density is a measure of the cost of private education due to its relationship to transportation cost.
The demand variables are included to measure the demand for private schools at the beginning of the period. Changes over the period or expectations of change could affect the decision to close. In order to account for this, models were estimated that include the growth rate of the school-age population over the decade, the percentage change in per capita income, the change in the percent Catholic, and the change in the percent nonwhite.
The private school survey contains several variables that pertain to characteristics of the private school. Our data indicate whether the school is a religious school and give the school's religious affiliation. To reflect the potential for funding a private school, beyond the income of the parents, we include two measures of religious affiliation. RELIG equals one if the private school has a religious affiliation other than Catholic, while CATH equals one if the school is a Catholic school. We use dummy variables to distinguish between private schools that serve elementary schools only (grades -8), denoted ELEM, or high schools only (grades 9-2), denoted HS, and all other schools. 2 We 2. While most of the non-high school private schools are elementary only, there are many schools that serve all grades or some mix of high school and elementary grades.
measure the size of the school by the size of the student body, denoted STSIZE, or alternatively by the number of teachers, denoted TEACH. Because schools that are about to fail may have suffered declining enrollments prior to closing, we determine the maximum number of teachers and student body over the period before failure. We have no measure of the cost structure of the private school, so we consider the average teacher salary for public schools in the county, denoted SALARY, on the assumption that higher public school salaries would force private schools to pay higher salaries (see Vedder and Hall 2000) . We calculate this by dividing total instructional salaries by the number of fulltime equivalent teachers (from the Common Core of Data from NCES). Finally, we consider the number of years the school has been in service, with the expectation that newer schools are more likely to exit than schools with longer histories. We define a dummy variable, SHORTTM, that takes the value of one if the school has been in existence for fewer than 5 years. Table 2 contains the unweighted descriptive statistics describing the characteristics of the private schools, while statistics for public schools and demographic variables are in table 3. Beginning with the sample of 2,000 schools, we find that over the next twelve years, 424 schools ceased operations. The tables show statistics computed for the full sample and then computed separately for the schools that survived and those that failed.
There are some minor but interesting differences in some of the demographic variables. For example, per capita income is somewhat higher in the counties where the surviving schools are located. The percentage of the population that is nonwhite is very similar for surviving and exiting schools. Failing schools are on average located in counties with a lower population density. Employment numbers, relative to the size of the population, are higher in the counties where surviving schools are located.
There are more substantial differences in enrollment and faculty sizes. The failing schools had fewer students (an average of 67 compared to a mean of 326 for the surviving schools) and fewer teachers (about 2 on average as opposed to just over 23). There were lower failure rates among the Catholic schools; only about 4 percent of the 909 Catholic schools in this sample closed. Figure  presents the number of all (26,72) private schools in the NCES file by age, for schools that are fewer than eighty-nine years old and reported their age. The pattern is consistent with the premise that many new schools fail quickly and then the failure rate declines. Of course, the pattern is also consistent with the scenario of an increasing growth rate of private schools following World War II through the end of the 970s. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We estimate probit models for the probability of exit using the random sample of 2,000 private schools. Table 4 contains the results. The discussion that follows focuses on estimated marginal effects, with these computed at the means of the covariates. In the previous section, many possible covariates were considered. However, the results reported in table 4 result from a more parsimonious model. At the end of this section, we discuss estimation results when other variables are included; for the most part, these additional variables have insignificant coefficients and have no substantive effect on the results for other variables.
Consider the results for the all-school sample (column 2 of table 4). For the factors internal to the school, we find that most of the private school characteristics variables have the anticipated effects on the probability of exit. Schools in existence for fewer than fifteen years (SHORTTM) were more likely to fail than those schools that had been around for a longer time. Being in existence for fewer than 5 years increases the probability of closing by 8.0 percentage points, which is an increase of over one-third from the overall failure rate of 2.2 percent. Measuring SHORTTM based on five years or ten years rather than fifteen years has little impact on the marginal effect of this variable. These results are consistent with our expectations and with the literature on the failure of nonprofits. There are many reasons why newer schools are more likely to fail. They may have to rely on skills from outside the organization, which may be less committed to the organization than an internal staff. New schools may not have established routines, so management issues become major challenges. New schools lack reputation and have less loyalty, which means a lower probability of surviving a funding problem or the rise of a competing school. Finally, if newer schools are smaller, they have less financial flexibility to adapt to reduced financial support. As expected, school size as measured by total enrollment, STSIZE, has a negative and statistically significant effect on the failure probabilities. An increase in enrollment of ten students (3.4 percent increase from the mean) reduces the probability of failure by about half a percentage point.
High-school-only private schools were somewhat more likely to fail than other private schools, and elementary-only schools are somewhat less likely to fail; however, these coefficients are not statistically significantly different from zero. We had expected that failure would be higher among elementary schools; it is perceived to be easier to start an elementary school, and thus we felt that these schools might be in a more financially precarious position.
Being a Catholic or other religion-affiliated school reduces the probability of closure, although the coefficients on these variables are not precisely measured. Compared with non-religion-affiliated schools, Catholic and other religion-affiliated schools were about 3 or 4 percentage points less likely to close, other factors equal.
Consider next the variables that reflect market conditions. Given demand, a larger available supply of private schools is expected to reflect an excess supply; thus we would expect a greater probability of closure. Likewise, a greater demand for private schools is expected to reflect an excess demand, so we would expect a smaller probability of closure. If demand and supply move together, however, the effects of supply and demand will be difficult to detect.
Consider first the supply of private schools. The market saturation variable, SUPPLY, was computed as the number of private schools in the county divided Notes: Estimated standard errors are robust. Marginal effects for dummy variables are computed as the change in probability as the dummy variable changes from zero to one. * significant at 10%; * * significant at 5%; * * * significant at 1%
by the school-age population measured in 00,000s. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant. A one standard deviation increase in this variable, which would mean an increase of about 50 schools in the mean county, holding school-age population constant, would increase the probability of failure by almost 2.2 percentage points. We also include the growth in the number of private schools (NEWSCH). The coefficient on this variable is also positive, but it is small and not precisely measured. These results are consistent with the view that holding demand fixed, a greater supply implies an excess supply, resulting in a larger probability of closure.
We turn now to the variables that were included to measure demand. We have no one measure of demand, but we rely on variables that have been used to explain private school enrollment. Consider first our measure of the potential size of the market-that is, the school-age population. This variable, SCHAGE, has a negative but statistically insignificant coefficient. The coefficient on GSCHGAGE, the growth in the school-age population, is positive and insignificant.
The results for the economic variables were mixed. The quasi-employment rate, EMPRATE, had a strong negative impact on failure. An increase of one standard deviation in this variable would imply about a 5.5 percentage point decrease in the probability of failure.
We included two measures of household financial well-being, per capita income (PCI) and the poverty rate. The coefficient on per capita income is unexpectedly positive and statistically significant. We hypothesized that higher income would be associated with greater demand for private schools and with the potential for greater financial support. If EMPRATE is excluded from the regression, the coefficient on PCI is much smaller, but it is still positive though insignificant. This result is at odds with the descriptive statistics, which indicate that counties where surviving schools are located have a slightly higher per capita income, on average, than do counties with failing schools. The poverty rate (POV), on the other hand, has a statistically significant positive effect on failure. A one standard deviation increase in POV (from around 2 percent to about 8 percent) would increase the probability of failure by over 5 percentage points. To the extent that POV measures financial resources in the community, a positive effect was expected.
It is difficult to assess the impact of the demand variables by looking at the effect of each one separately. Another way of measuring the impact of these variables is to compute predicted probabilities of failure for both strong and weak demand situations. Thus we construct a strong demand county by setting both employment rates and per capita income to values 20 percent above the means. We also set poverty rates 20 percent below the mean. A weak demand county requires setting the levels of employment and per capita income 20 percent below their mean values, with poverty 20 percent above the mean (other variables are set at the sample means). The predicted failure rate for a nonreligious school with strong demand variables is about 8.8 percent, whereas a nonreligious school with weak demand has a 23.7 percent exit probability. The same computations for a religious school indicate that both predicted probabilities drop by about 3 percentage points.
Another view of the poverty variable is that it could also be a measure of the heterogeneity of the population, in which case we would expect that the larger the poverty rate in a county, the more likely it is that nonpoverty status parents will send their child to a private school. Our results, however, indicate the opposite: increasing poverty increases the probability of failure. However, as noted above, a low poverty rate and a very high poverty rate both reflect homogeneity. To account for that possibility we reran the model including both poverty and poverty squared. This quadratic specification yields insignificant results for both variables.
The demographic variables we include are whether the school is located in a metropolitan area (METRO), population density (DEN), and measures of racial heterogeneity. The coefficient on METRO is positive and statistically significant; as noted above, METRO could reflect both larger demand and greater competition. The positive coefficient is consistent with greater competition. The coefficient on DEN is negative and insignificant. The effects of racial heterogeneity are measured with a quadratic specification based on the percent of the population in 990 that is nonwhite (PCNW and PCNWSQ). These variables indicate that increasing heterogeneity raises the failure probability until the percentage nonwhite reaches about 40 percent. As the percent nonwhite increases past 40 percent, the probability of failure starts to decline.
The student-teacher ratio, STRATIO, measures public school quality, with higher values suggesting lower quality; this variable consistently showed a strong negative relationship with the probability of private school failure, meaning that higher student-teacher ratios are associated with lower failure probabilities for private schools. This provides some support for the notion that parents respond to quality aspects of public schools.
We estimate several alternative models. First, we consider elementary schools only (column 3 of table 4). We assume that the startup of elementary schools is easier than schools that offer all grades or high school grades. This suggests that it may be more likely that there could be an oversupply of elementary schools and that they may start on weaker financial footings. The results for elementary only do not differ essentially from the results reported in column 2 of table 4 (all schools). Note that coefficients on per capita income and poverty are insignificant.
Second, we consider only schools located in metropolitan areas. The impact of competition from other private schools in the full sample might be obscured to some extent because there are many private schools in our sample operating in counties where there are either no other or few other private schools. For example, among 5,046 schools that we were able to geo-code, there are ,500 schools operating in counties with three or fewer private schools. To see whether competition has a stronger impact in places where there actually could be competition, we limited the sample to counties located in metropolitan areas and re-estimated the model. The results (column 4 of table 4) are basically the same as those in column 2. One difference to note is that the coefficient on SUPPLY is larger and the coefficient on NEWSCH is significant. This is consistent with the view that competition among private schools might be more intense in metropolitan areas. (We also restricted the counties to those with four or more private schools. These counties are essentially just metropolitan counties and thus the results are nearly identical to those in column 4.)
We also estimated a set of probit equations that included additional covariates. As an alternative measure of school size we considered the number of teachers. The marginal effect for the number of teachers is −0.009, so an increase of ten teachers (about one-half a standard deviation for this variable) would lower the probability of closure by almost  percentage point. The marginal effect of teachers is larger than would be expected by dividing the marginal effect of the number of students by the average class size (6.9).
As noted above, we did not have cost factors for private schools. As a proxy for cost, we used the average salary of public school teachers in 999 (SALARY) to measure private school costs. However, when SALARY was added, its coefficient was negative but very small and insignificant. The other coefficients were largely unchanged. One explanation for the insignificant coefficient is that in areas where education is highly valued, parents support both public and private schools. School teacher salaries are high, but this is both a cost factor for private schools and an indication of preferences.
In addition to the change in the number of private schools, we estimated the model including the number of new charter schools divided by the school-age population (in 00,000s), denoted CHARTER. The coefficient on this variable was virtually zero.
As an alternative to percent nonwhite, we used the percent Catholic in the population (PCCATH) to measure commonality of interest. The coefficient was not statistically significant. We also estimated a model that included percent Catholic and percent Catholic squared. These coefficients were very small, with large standard errors. In addition, as an alternative for percent nonwhite we tried the absolute value of the difference between 50 percent and the value of the variable; this alternative did not yield coefficients that were statistically significant. Since percent Catholic and percent poor were never larger than 50 percent, it made no sense to try this for these two variables.
We considered alternative measures of public school competition, including expenditures per student and the dropout rate. The instructional expenditures per student never showed a substantive or statistically significant impact on exit probabilities. In some specifications, the high school dropout rate had a statistically significant positive impact on the probability of failure for private schools, which seems counterintuitive.
We included other control variables, including percent with a college degree, the crime rate, and the proportion voting Republican in the 988 election. None of these variables had any measurable impact on failure. Further, when these other control variables were included, the impacts of the primary variables were very similar to the results reported in table 4.
A possible concern is that counties in the West are larger than counties in the rest of the country and thus reflect a different market size. We estimated models that included a dummy variable equal to one for counties located in a western state as well as a model that excluded counties in western states. Our results as reported above did not change for either of these two alternative models.
Finally, we reran our basic model as reported in column 2 of table 4 but used all 5,046 private schools that we were able to geo-code. For this sample we determined whether a school closed if it did not respond to any of the last three surveys. We know from the analysis of our random sample of the 2,000 schools that relying on survey nonresponse overstates the failure rate. However, the results using all 5,046 schools are very similar to those for our random sample of 2,000, with the signs and significance levels largely unchanged.
SUMMARY
This article uses national survey data from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) to study closures of private schools, events that occur with some frequency. The principal purpose of the analysis is to explore the question of whether the behavior of nonprofit private schools is consistent with a market model of for-profit firm behavior. Our model assumed that the closure of a nonprofit private school is the result of market disequilibrium and characteristics of the specific school. In particular, we hypothesized that the probability of an exit by a private school is an increasing function of the difference between the supply of and the demand for private schools in the market, as well as a function of school-specific factors. We relied on the existing literature that attempts to explain the percent of students in private school to select variables related to the demand, and on the literature on the closure of nonprofits to select the school-specific variables.
As do other studies of the closure of firms and nonprofit organizations, we find that younger and smaller schools are more likely to close. However, we found no significant effect by grades served or religious affiliation.
The empirical results regarding the effect of market conditions are less clear. The basic hypothesis is that the probability of closure will be positively correlated with excess supply of private schools. We measure supply by the number of private schools scaled by school-age population and rely on several variables to measure demand. Our supply variable has the expected sign. However, the results for the demand variables are mixed. Thus our results provide evidence that market forces play a role in determining private school closures, although the evidence is somewhat weak.
There is an implicit assumption in the literature on public school choice that nonprofit private school supply will respond to match any increase in demand generated, for example, by a voucher system that allows parents to opt out of poorly performing public schools. Other than this article, to our knowledge no one has tried to verify this empirically. Our work is the first step in examining this assumption, and our results suggest that market forces have an effect on nonprofit private schools.
An important issue that our research only begins to examine is the reaction of private schools to public school quality. Our results indicate that public school districts where student-teacher ratios are high led to lower failure probabilities for private schools. This evidence is indirect at best; longitudinal data on public and private schools are needed to analyze the impact of changing quality in the public schools on the private school market.
